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Abstract 
This study characterizes theoretical and industry approaches to organizational 
capabilities management and ascertains whether there is a distinct “best practice” in 
this regard. We consider both physical capabilities, such as technical disciplines and 
infrastructure, and non-physical capabilities such as corporate culture and 
organizational procedures. We examine Resource-Based Theory (RBT), which is the 
predominant organizational management theory focused on capabilities. RBT seeks to 
explain the effect of capabilities on competitiveness, and thus provide a basis for 
investment/divestment decisions. We then analyze industry approaches described to 
us in interviews with representatives from Goodyear, 3M, Intel, Ford, NASA, 
Lockheed Martin, and Boeing. We found diversity amongst the industry capability 
management approaches. Although all organizations manage capabilities and 
consider them to some degree in their strategies, no two approaches that we observed 
were identical. Furthermore, we observed that theory is not a strong driver in this 
regard. No organization used the term “Resource-Based Theory,” nor did any 
organization mention any other guiding theory or practice from the organizational 
management literature when explaining their capabilities management approaches. As 
such, we concluded that there is no single best practice for capabilities management. 
Nevertheless, we believe that RBT and the diverse industry experiences described 
herein can provide useful insights to support development of capabilities management 
approaches. 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1. Background and Approach 
Sandia National Laboratories, like many other organizations, faces decisions on investing in (or 
divesting from) corporate “capabilities.” In the context of these decisions and the processes that 
support them, it is often asked what are the theoretical and industry approaches to capabilities 
management, and is there a best practice in this regard? Our study addresses these questions.  
In our research, we turned to Resource-Based Theory (RBT) because it is the predominant 
organizational management theory focusing on capabilities (other theories focus on things such 
as costs, efficiencies, or control of inputs and outputs).* RBT seeks to explain the effect of 
corporate capabilities on competitiveness and thereby provide a basis for capability investment / 
divestment decisions. Using a framework provided by RBT, we interviewed representatives from 
Goodyear, 3M, Intel, Ford, NASA, Lockheed Martin, and Boeing to understand how they 
manage capabilities.  
1.2. Caveats 
We utilize RBT in this study because it focuses on capabilities and thus can provide a uniform 
standard against which to compare industry approaches. Nevertheless, RBT is but one theory of 
corporate competitiveness. We make no attempt to assess the merits of RBT relative to other 
theories. Furthermore, this is not an exhaustive survey of all theoretical aspects and/or industry 
applications of RBT or capabilities management. Although the companies examined are leaders 
in industry, they were selected primarily because they have preexisting relationships with Sandia 
National Laboratories which afforded frank discussion of organizational management 
approaches. Finally, this is not an exhaustive survey across each organization. We relied on the 
perspectives of a few (albeit well-informed) individuals. 
1.3. Resource-Based Theory in a Nutshell 
Organizational resources include physical capabilities, such as technical disciplines (e.g., 
structural engineering, field testing) and infrastructure (e.g., test or manufacturing facilities), and 
non-physical capabilities such as corporate culture, organizational structure, or procedures.† RBT 
was driven by the observation that two companies can possess similar physical capabilities and 
financial positions, yet one company is far more successful than the other. RBT scholars attribute 
the preeminent company’s success to the unique harmonization of physical and non-physical 
capabilities that enables it to excel in meeting a particular market need. 
Resource-based theory calls for organizations to: 
• understand the role of physical and non-physical capabilities in competitive advantage,  
• maintain the health of key resources, and 
• use the understanding of unique corporate strengths as the basis for selecting markets in 
which to compete. 
                                                 
* For a survey of organizational theories, see “A Historical Comparison of Resource-Based Theory and Five Schools 
of Thought within Industrial Organization Economics: Do We Have a New Theory of the Firm?”, Kathleen R. 
Conner, Journal of Management, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 121-154, 1991. 
† Shortly, we will introduce more specific terms for different types of capabilities. 
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2. RBT CONCEPTS AND TERMINOLOGY 
Inconsistent terminology is a shortcoming of resource-based theory. Terms such as “capability” 
and “core competency” are used broadly throughout the literature and corporate thinking. Yet, 
these terms often have different meanings to different authors or organizations, with some 
authors/organizations using the same terms to describe physical capabilities that other 
authors/organizations use to describe non-physical ones. Nevertheless, once the terminology 
barrier is overcome, the RBT literature is fairly consistent on the interplay and role of different 
types of capabilities in organizational competitiveness. In this section we define the terms we 
will use for different types of capabilities and delineate how RBT posits they combine to provide 
competitive advantage. Given RBT’s diverse terminology, our terms are not necessarily those 
used throughout the literature or the industry conversations.  
2.1. Skills - What the Organization Does 
Skills are what the organization must do, and the tools the organization must use, to produce its 
end products (they are not the end products themselves). Thus, skills are physical capabilities  
and include technical competencies (e.g., engineering, quality control, system integration) and 
the infrastructure to support them (e.g., test and production facilities, specialized research 
equipment). For example, Toyota’s skills include automotive engineering, heavy machining, 
quality control, and marketing.  
Organizations will likely have tens of skills, and few will be unique when compared to those of 
similar organizations (like Toyota, Ford Motor also has automotive engineering and heavy 
machining skills). Nevertheless, a skill’s lack of uniqueness does not necessarily diminish its 
importance to the organization. The importance of an individual skill must be assessed based on  
the competitive ramifications of the organization losing that skill. Furthermore, if an organization 
has a diverse set of products, it will probably have skills that do not support all products. Finally, 
an organization might have skills that met a bygone need, and have been retained even though 
they no longer support any products.  
There are some notable exceptions where organizations have skills that are clearly superior to 
those of their competitors. Intel’s ability to quickly and exactly reproduce highly complex 
production “fabs” around the globe is one such instance. Although fabs are not its end product, 
Intel’s skill in this area affords it one of its critical competitive advantages. 
2.2. Distinctive Organizational Behaviors – the “How and Why” 
Distinctive organizational behaviors is the term we apply to the how and why the organization 
does what it does. Distinctive organizational behaviors are non-physical capabilities that can be 
thought of as the ethos that imbues uniqueness to how an organization employs its skills in 
producing its end products.  
Organizational behaviors are often the manifestation of culture and practices that arise to meet 
specific challenges (e.g., the unique culture that evolved at Los Alamos during the Manhattan 
Project). Behaviors might evolve over time and become irrelevant, inadequate, or unsustainable 
as the external environment changes and/or as the organization grows. The expedience of the 
Manhattan Project gave way to a more constrained environment with the advent of the Cold War. 
Similarly, the tight-knit team environment prevalent in many start-up companies often disappears 
as these companies grow to the point where each employee no longer knows everyone else. 
Nevertheless, organizations can take deliberate steps to nurture distinctive organizational 
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behaviors (e.g., Goodyear’s establishment of innovation hubs described later in this report). 
Deliberately fostering behaviors is the essence of what Kaplan describes as establishing 
“learning and growth” characteristics in his thesis on strategy maps.*  
As is the case with skills, not all distinctive organizational behaviors necessarily come into play 
for all products or processes. If an organization has diverse products, it probably also has 
organizational behaviors that contribute to some product types, but that do not come into play for 
others. Similarly, some distinctive organizational behaviors might feed only part of the product 
cycle (which is exemplified in the R&D/production dichotomy that we discuss later in this 
report).  
The literature asserts that, because distinctive organizational behaviors are often subtle, some 
organizations actually have difficulty identifying them. The list below, drawn from articles by 
Ulrich and Smallwood and by Stalk, et al., is a compendium of characteristics that tend to be 
prevalent in successful organizations. Often, distinctive organizational behaviors stem from a 
combination of these characteristics. Efforts to identify organizational behaviors can include 
assessing the degree to which these characteristics are present in an organization and their role in 
providing value to customers. Note that it would not be expected that any one organization 
would posses all of these characteristics because some will invariably be irrelevant to a given 
organization’s particular mission. 
• Talent – technically excellent performance  
• Speed – quickly responding to customer or market demands and/or quickly incorporating 
new ideas and technologies into products 
• Accountability – linking performance to rewards 
• Collaboration – partnering across corporate boundaries 
• Corporate learning – adapting corporate practices in light of accumulated experience 
• Corporate leadership – effectively articulating and implementing strategy 
• Customer connectivity – building enduring trust relationships with targeted customers  
• Strategic unity – pursuing a shared strategic vision 
• Coherent corporate identity – possessing a common mindset 
• Innovation – generating new ideas and combining existing elements to create new 
sources of value 
• Efficiency – cost effectively delivering products 
• Consistency – producing products that unfailingly satisfy customer expectations 
• Acuity – seeing the competitive environment clearly and anticipating customers' evolving 
needs 
• Agility – simultaneously adapting to different business environments 
                                                 
* Kaplan, R. S. and Norton, D. P., Having Trouble with Your Strategy? Then Map It, in Harvard Business Review, 
September / October 2000. 
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The literature points out that it is often difficult for organizations to reach consensus in this 
regard, leading one author to suggest incorporating a consensus-building step into efforts to 
identify distinctive organizational behaviors.  
Back to our Toyota example – its distinctive organizational behaviors include a holistic 
development approach that integrates design and production to yield products that can be 
manufactured in a cost-effective manner, a defect minimization mindset that enhances product 
reliability, and market acuity that links consumer desires to innovative directions.  
2.3. Market Differentiators – What the Organization Does Best 
Market differentiators are what the organization does best relative to its competitors. 
Specifically, market differentiators are the harmonization of a set of skills through application of 
distinctive organizational behaviors to meet a market need.  
Prahalad and Hamel observed that market differentiators* 
• provide potential access to a wide variety of markets, 
• make a significant contribution to the customer value of the end product, and 
• are difficult for competitors to imitate. 
Given these constraints, resource-based theory points out that most companies will have only a 
few market differentiators.  
While organizational behaviors and skills tend to be internally driven, by definition, market 
differentiators can exist only in the context of external market drivers. Prahalad and Hamel’s 
criteria highlight that these drivers include customer value and competitors’ abilities. As such, 
assessing market differentiators must include gathering and analyzing market intelligence on 
these external drivers. 
Returning to our earlier example, taken in concert, Toyota’s organizational behaviors and skills 
yield a Toyota market differentiator – producing automobiles characterized by competitive price, 
high reliability, and innovative features.  
In his book Good To Great, Jim Collins provides a simple yet elegant diagram explaining his 
“Hedgehog Concept,” which is largely a recasting of RBT. Inspired by Collins, we have 
constructed the diagram shown in Figure 1 to graphically represent RBT’s thesis that market 
differentiators arise from the intersection of skills, distinctive organizational behaviors, and 
market needs. 
 
                                                 
* Prahalad and Hamel use the term “core competency” to refer to market differentiators. They also use this term to 
refer to distinctive organizational behaviors. For consistency and clarity, we have substituted our terminology. 
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Figure 1.  Market Differentiators - harmonization of skills through application of distinctive 
organizational behaviors to meet a market need 
2.4. Industry Partners Through the RBT Lens 
In this section, we assess the competitive attributes of Goodyear, Intel, Ford, 3M, NASA, 
Lockheed Martin, and Boeing using RBT. This approach allows us to make “apples-to-apples” 
comparisons when organizations use different terminology for similar types of resources. It also 
allows us to highlight different types of resources and their role in an RBT context – even if the 
organizations themselves did not portray the resources this way. Nevertheless, we stress that a 
posteriori assessment of organizations using RBT (or any organizational theory) can 
inadvertently create the impression that the organizations used RBT a priori in their planning – 
which may not be the case! In fact, no organization that we examined used the term “Resource-
Based Theory,” nor did any organization mention any other guiding theory or practice from the 
organizational management literature when explaining their approaches to capabilities 
management. That said, the examples from the industry interviews presented in the remainder of 
this report show that, although the organizations do not follow named or published capabilities 
management approaches, they all engage in deliberate capabilities management activities, many 
of which are consistent with RBT.  
Goodyear’s market differentiator is cutting-edge, distinctive tire concepts. Notable among 
Goodyear’s skills is computer modeling that serves to both enhance the engineers’ understanding 
of fundamental tire behavior and reduce tire development time. Innovation is one of Goodyear’s 
distinctive organizational behaviors. All seven points of CEO Keegan’s vision, “Seven Reasons 
to Believe,” include the word “innovation,” and Goodyear is taking steps to institutionalize 
innovation. 
Intel’s market differentiator is the ability to quickly bring to market large volumes of new-
generation micro-chips. Underlying this strength are skills in producing silicon semi-conductors, 
running supply lines, and building and operating “fabs.” Intel’s distinctive organizational 
behaviors include structured risk taking, failure analysis, problem solving, process control, and 
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acuity – the last being highlighted by the interviewee’s comment that, to stay ahead, Intel must 
“read the customer’s mind.”  
Ford subscribes to the concept of market differentiators. In their Power Train group, the market 
differentiator is engine engineering, which is built upon a foundation of skills referred to as “the 
Five Cs” (cylinder head, cylinder block, etc.). Ford has collocated product engineering and 
manufacturing engineering to support its distinctive organizational behavior of cross-disciplinary 
synergy and interaction. 
3M’s market differentiator of multi-application technologies derives from its roughly 35 skills. 
These include materials (adhesives, abrasives, ceramics, etc.) and processes (electronic 
packaging, molding, polymer melt processing, etc.). 3M’s distinctive organizational behaviors 
include innovation, process development, and market focus. 3M leverages its skills across its 
diverse market-focused business areas.* For example, the ability of both the Industrial and Health 
Care Businesses to develop market-focused specialty adhesive products ties back to the 
underlying corporate adhesives skill. 
The NASA interviewee noted that they firmly believe in the concept of market differentiators. 
Each NASA center† has a small list (~3-4) of market differentiators that all must have proven 
track records. Most market differentiators are expressed in a “one line” description.  
Interestingly, NASA does not disclose its list of market differentiators, as it is viewed as 
proprietary (a notional example is: “rapid development, prototyping, and demonstration of 
payload delivery vehicles”). A competitive behavior underlying NASA’s market differentiators 
is  project management (where “project” refers to efforts on the order of hundreds of millions of 
dollars). NASA has a distinct career path for project managers wherein they do not supervise 
personnel. Instead, they focus on project execution and cross-NASA integration of the market 
differentiators to bring them to bear on a variety of problems. 
Because of its diversity, Lockheed Martin has several market differentiators that typically do not 
overlap. As such, each market differentiator is usually supported by specific skills and behaviors. 
Furthermore, individual Lockheed Martin companies manage their own skills and behaviors. 
That said, Lockheed Martin is attempting to establish a corporate list. The tendency at Lockheed 
Martin is to focus on market driven skills and the resulting market differentiators. Although there 
is little conscious focus on organizational behaviors, there is an awareness that they exist. For 
example, Lockheed Martin Aeronautics’ Skunk Works is known for flexibility and problem 
solving ability.  
Boeing Commercial Airplane Systems is differentiated by designing and integrating large, 
customer-focused aircraft systems. Customer focus is a Boeing distinctive behavior and is 
exemplified by Boeing’s strategy of tailoring the internal aircraft configuration to the individual 
airline’s needs. Boeing takes the “customer” concept beyond the airlines to the travelers. The 
carrying capacity and runway compatibility requirements of Boeing’s most recent venture, the 
787, are based on Boeing’s perceptions of traveler habits and desires. Specifically, Boeing holds 
that the rival Airbus 380 concept of a super-jumbo aircraft will be unpopular with travelers 
                                                 
* 3M is divided into 5 large businesses (e.g. Industrial, Optical, Displays and Graphics, Health Care). Each large 
business is broken into divisions (e.g., Healthcare includes Dental, Pharmaceutical, Drug Dispensing, Orthodontics, 
etc.). 
† NASA has ~10 centers, including Johnson Space Center, Kennedy Space Center, etc.  
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because it will lead to long aircraft loading/unloading times and because it will force travelers to 
fly to a limited number of  hubs (whose runways can handle such a large aircraft) and then catch 
connecting flights to final destinations. In contrast, the smaller 787 can land on a larger 
percentage of existing runways and can therefore reach more final destinations.  
Boeing’s skills include Lean manufacturing and large system integration (LSI). Boeing holds 
that it adds the most value in its role as the aircraft system designer and integrator. Boeing 
integrates thousands of aircraft sub-systems produced by a host of suppliers. Boeing has even 
gone so far as to outsource fuselage production for its 737 aircraft. Boeing’s investment in Lean 
Manufacturing over the past several years has revolutionized final aircraft assembly, with Boeing 
introducing the first-ever moving assembly line for large commercial aircraft. 
2.5. Capabilities Management – a Diversity of  Approaches 
In this section we highlight the diversity in the capabilities management approaches taken by the 
organizations we studied.* This diversity led us to conclude that there is no single best practice 
regarding capabilities management. 
None of the organizations differentiated between distinctive behaviors, skills, and market 
differentiators, with most organizations referring to all of them as “core competencies” or 
“capabilities.”† For example, corporate literature listed Boeing’s core competencies as customer 
knowledge and focus, Lean enterprise, and LSI. RBT holds that one is a distinctive behavior, and 
the other two are skills. Furthermore, most interviewees did not make a clear distinction between 
physical and non-physical resources. Nevertheless, they could usually provide insights into non-
physical resources when they were asked specifically about culture. Furthermore, all 
organizations understood how their distinctive behaviors provided an advantage in their markets. 
The companies tended to blend practices that the theoretical literature considers mutually 
exclusive (notably blending market-based and resource-based approaches). For example, some 
interviewees reported that, for them, the first step in identifying differentiators was to look at an 
organizational chart, with the assumption that the organization is probably already aligned with 
its differentiators. This is contrary to the approach advocated by RBT wherein differentiators are 
separated from activities and /or business areas. 
Virtually all of the companies we examined have a relatively narrow and static market focus 
such as tires or commercial aircraft. Thus, they tended to develop resources to meet market needs 
(i.e., market-back strategy) instead of seeking markets in which their existing resources would 
give them an advantage (as advocated by RBT). For example, at the corporate level 3M looks for 
“mega-trends” (e.g., nano-technology) and selects associated markets in which to compete. 3M 
either seeks the technology to compete in these markets in-house, or acquires it (e.g., 3M 
acquired the leading preventative dental care company as part of their expansion into that area). 
                                                 
* Our interview outline is presented in Appendix A, and our interview notes are in Appendix B. 
† We realize that, in some cases the respondents’ terminology might have reflected how the questions were posed. 
We made the distinctions herein based on context and our understanding of RBT elements. 
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3. NURTURING BEHAVIORS AND SKILLS  
3.1. The Role of the Corporate Leadership 
The RBT literature highlights the role of corporate leadership in managing and maintaining skills 
and distinctive behaviors. Theorists Prahalad and Hamel hold that successful corporations are 
portfolios of behaviors and skills rather than of businesses. The key to these corporations’ 
success is how they manage their distinctive behaviors and skills. Furthermore, the literature 
holds that distinctive organizational behaviors and skills are corporate resources that should be 
managed by the CEO. Prahalad and Hamel contend that the independent business unit construct 
tends to blur corporate focus on behaviors and skills. Typically, no one executive controls the 
behaviors or skills that happen to cross internal corporate boundaries. To address this problem, 
Stalk, et al. suggest that building behaviors and skills should be the primary agenda of the CEO, 
stressing that skills building cannot be treated as an operating matter and left to corporate staff or 
Strategic Business Unit (SBU) heads. They argue, that “only the CEO can focus the entire 
company's attention on creating behaviors and skills that serve customers. Only the CEO can 
identify and authorize the infrastructure investments on which strategic skills depend.”* They 
add that in many instances, senior managers must undergo a fundamental philosophical shift that 
allows them to see their corporate strategy in terms of behaviors and skills.  
Often, existing business practices cannot support a capability-based view of the corporation. 
Leveraging capabilities requires a host of strategic investments across SBUs. Furthermore, 
investment in non-physical organizational behaviors can be difficult to justify using traditional 
cost-benefit metrics. 
3.2. Fostering Distinctive Organizational Behaviors  
Organizational culture was a recurring theme in our interviews, with most of the companies we 
interviewed describing deliberate steps to foster distinctive organizational behaviors.  
Historically, Goodyear has been able to successfully “innovate on demand” in response to crises. 
Yet, the interviewees lamented that, in stable times, innovation tends to give way to 
conservatism. Thus, fostering a culture of innovation can, at times, be a tough sell. To ensure the 
vitality of innovation, Goodyear is working to implement mechanisms to bring the elements of 
innovation together. Goodyear holds that a combined awareness of both market needs and of 
available technologies and possible solutions is a key to innovation. Thus, informal cross-
functional information exchange involving people with diverse perspectives is fundamental to 
the innovation process. Accordingly, Goodyear formed an “innovation hub.” The hub has 
sponsored forums for information exchange, electronic idea submission, and even exercises to 
make “linear-minded” technical people comfortable with the often non-linear elements of 
innovative thinking.   
Intel has a unique culture that it instills in its employees via courses and rewards. Topics covered 
include guidance on how to run a meeting, and even how to conduct a technical argument (both 
of which support the failure analysis/problem-solving behaviors that are vital to ensuring that 
Intel can keep processes on track). Intel reinforces its values through its rewards system. 
                                                 
* Stalk, G., Evans, P., and Shulman, L. E., Competing on Capabilities: The New Rules of corporate Strategy, in 
Harvard Business Review, March-April, 1992. 
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When a Ford engineer joins the Power Train group (PT), he/she begins a 2-year mentor-guided 
training process that includes classes on the fundamentals of power train engineering, a series of 
rotations in different parts of the group, and on-the-job training. The culture and rewards in PT 
are team oriented and production directed. The Ford interviewee noted that when he did a stint 
with PT in Europe, he encountered virtually the same organizational culture he was familiar with 
here in the US. Interestingly, the same interviewee described experiencing greater culture shock 
when he transferred to the research-focused Product Development group here in the US, than he 
did when he went to PT in Germany. 
3.3. Culture: The R&D – Production Dichotomy 
Most companies we examined exhibited a dichotomy between their R&D cultures and their 
engineering and manufacturing cultures – with the two sometimes being in conflict. The 
interviewees described how they addressed this dichotomy in an effort to ensure the health of 
often mutually exclusive behaviors.  
Goodyear found that, although important for manufacturing or compliance, the structured, 
“linear” mindset associated with operational excellence tools such as Lean or Six Sigma tend to 
militate against innovation. To address this dichotomy, Goodyear is encouraging different 
cultures in different parts of the organization, with the innovating parts being given more 
freedom. Notably, the culture becomes more constrained further down the product cycle. The 
Goodyear R&D budget is broken into two main pieces: fundamental and applied. Fundamental 
funding covers anticipated needs whereas applied funding is directed at short-term (often 
production-related) goals. The aforementioned innovation hub is funded via fundamental R&D.  
3M decouples technology development from product development through what it refers to as 
the NTI (New Technology Initiative) and NPI (New Product Initiative) processes, allowing a 
more innovative culture in the former, and more structure in the latter. NTI is early stage 
development, with broad potential applicability. NPI is market-need-driven applied development, 
and typically occurs only after basic technological hurdles have been overcome in NTI. At 3M, 
R&D is done both at the corporate level and the business level. All divisions pay for corporate 
R&D as an overhead charge. The goal is to spin technologies off via NTI to useful NPI efforts. 
Thus, there is, for example, both a corporate adhesives skill and a division adhesives skill in the 
Dental Division. The key is communication within the skills. 
At Intel, development goes from path finding (identifying new technology focus areas), to road 
mapping (near term needs, dates, goals), to basic R&D, and factory floor / process R&D. The 
culture and rewards vary along this continuum. 
The R&D / manufacturing dichotomy also exists at Ford. As noted earlier, the research-focused 
Product Development Group rewards individual accomplishments. In contrast, the production-
focused Power Train group is very team-oriented.  
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4. THE ROLE OF MARKET DIFFERENTIATORS IN STRATEGY 
4.1. The Theoretical Approach to Strategy  
RBT calls for organizations to maintain a healthy set of distinctive behaviors and skills and then 
identify markets in which they can become differentiators – which is in contrast to the approach 
of selecting markets and then attempting to develop differentiators to compete in these markets 
(which is referred to as “market-back” strategy). All three elements (skills, distinctive 
organizational behaviors, and market needs) must be present to yield a market differentiator. 
Thus, recalling the diagram in Figure 1, organizations must make investment or divestment 
decisions when they find parts of their business mapped into areas where only two elements 
intersect. We have constructed the following examples (and coined descriptive titles for each) to 
highlight the challenges an organization will face if it remains in an area on the diagram where 
one element is missing. Figure 2 shows where these challenging regions fall on the map of 
organizational resources and market needs. 
  
Figure 2. Using RBT to map challenges and opportunities  
• Uninspired Experts: An organization pursues an existing market need. It has the requisite 
skills, but lacks supporting distinctive organizational behaviors. As a result, the 
organization will not do better than its competitors. Absent the advantages afforded by 
distinctive organizational behaviors, this effort represents only a market initiative, not a 
market differentiator. Such was the situation facing US automotive companies when they 
were challenged by Japanese competitors in the 1980s.  To succeed, the organization must 
develop the distinctive behaviors  that will set it apart from its competitors. 
• Reinventing the Wheel: An organization pursues an existing market need. It has applicable 
organizational behaviors, but lacks the requisite skills. In this situation, the organization 
will apply its strengths to an area in which it does not possess the basic skills, making it 
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very hard to catch up to established competitors (imagine Intel suddenly deciding to make 
tires or cars). Given the challenges involved, significant effort is required to turn this type 
of initiative into a market differentiator. To succeed, the organization must either develop 
the requisite skills or partner with another organization already possessing them. Shortly, 
we will see examples of how Goodyear and Ford succeeded in this regard.  
• The Buggy-Whip* Company: An organization maintains existing behaviors and skills that 
served a bygone market need. Yet, because these behaviors and skills have become central 
to the organization’s culture, they continue to be valued, even though they are irrelevant. 
IBM had an internationally recognized R&D culture and abilities. Nevertheless, by the 
mid-1990s, IBM R&D was fast becoming irrelevant to the increasingly software- and 
service-centric demands of IBM’s customers. Given the absence of market needs, this 
cannot be considered a market initiative. Instead, it is an internal initiative that will likely 
drain corporate resources. To succeed, the organization must create new markets – as 
epitomized by Henry Ford’s seeing beyond the public’s desire for a “faster horse.” 
Needless to say, creating new markets is a challenge requiring market acuity, resources, 
and perseverance.  
4.2. Investing, Divesting, and Outsourcing – the Industry Experience 
We observed that, since most of the companies we interviewed had a relatively narrow product 
focus (except 3M and Lockheed Martin), they tended to have an a priori constraint on how far 
afield they would go when attempting to establish a new market differentiator. For such 
companies, new initiatives are typically just new applications within an existing business area 
(e.g., a new type of tire or a new chip or processor) as opposed to being a completely new 
business area. In mature markets, there tends to be fierce competition for small advantages. To 
combat this, 3M exploits “adjacent” markets (i.e., those that are similar). Instead of making large 
investments to chase minimal gains in the mature sandpaper market, the 3M Abrasives Division 
expanded into the adjacent specialty abrasives market. In taking this approach, 3M minimized 
the problems highlighted in Uninspired Experts and Reinventing the Wheel by staying close to 
existing organizational behaviors and skills. 
Goodyear provides an excellent example of investing to develop a skill. When steel-belted tires 
were first introduced in the 1970s, the steel wire necessary for this application was not readily 
available. In order to compete against Michelin, who pioneered the steel-belted radial tire, 
Goodyear realized that it had to be able to produce this wire. Goodyear invested in the wire skill, 
and hired a spectrum of personnel from material scientists doing basic research to process 
experts overseeing wire manufacture. The wire skill is an example of an organization 
overcoming the challenges of Reinventing the Wheel to ultimately establish a market 
differentiator. 
Goodyear also provides an example of how organizations often ignore irrelevant or weak areas 
rather than proactively managing a graceful divestment. Ironically, the Goodyear example 
pertains to the same wire skill that saved the company in the 1970s. Ultimately, when the wire 
for steel-belted radial tires became available from a variety of sources, the health of this skill 
suffered at Goodyear. Nevertheless, the skill and the associated personnel lingered until 
                                                 
* This is the situation characterized by the buggy whip analogy wherein an organization continued its efforts to sell 
(albeit excellent) whips for horse-drawn buggies after automobiles had made such buggies obsolete. 
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Goodyear faced another corporate crisis. Instead of gracefully closing down the skill in a manner 
that would retain talented personnel, actions were taken under duress and only “a rare few” 
individuals remained. The interviewees contended that a long-range vision should identify 
irrelevant areas and allow time for graceful divestment. 
Ford provided a more positive example wherein they divested from a declining skill while 
simultaneously investing in a new one. About 15 years ago, electronics became much more 
important in automotive design. Ford was faced with either laying off large numbers of 
mechanical engineers, whose skill set was in less demand, and replacing them with electrical 
engineers, or retraining mechanical engineers to be more versatile. They chose to do the latter, 
partnering with Wayne State University in an onsite degree program that was very successful. 
The Ford interviewee stressed that “upfront, open, honest communication is key to successful 
transition, particularly when an organization is facing crises and cutbacks. Even if the news is 
uncertain or bad, Ford takes the approach that it is better to communicate (than to not).” 
Until recently, Ford kept most key skills in house. Now they outsource skills  that are not directly 
tied to the engine block and power train. Realizing that there is the potential to lose insight into 
products and processes when tasks are outsourced, Ford ensures that there is a Ford employee 
who knows at least as much about the product as the group that will supply it. In this way, they 
retain a measure of control over key skills that they no longer own. 
Boeing Commercial Airplanes recently sold several manufacturing facilities, including the 
Wichita facility where fuselages are built, in large part because they were becoming increasingly 
removed from Boeing’s identified strength areas. The Wichita facility became part of a newly 
formed company, Spirit AeroSystems, from whom Boeing now purchases fuselages. Boeing 
contends that these divestments were motivated by a desire to focus on their skill in system 
integration.  
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5. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
Resource-Based Theory (RBT) explains that excelling at meeting market needs stems from the 
unique harmonization of an organization’s physical skills and non-physical distinctive 
organizational behaviors. Accordingly, RBT contends that corporate leadership must understand 
and nurture the appropriate skills and organizational behaviors so they can target market needs 
that provide the greatest competitive potential. Furthermore, RBT holds that leadership must use 
this understanding to guide investment and divestment. 
Our interviews with industry representatives showed that, although no organization used the term 
“Resource-Based Theory,” nor did any organization mention some other guiding theory or 
practice from the organizational management literature, they all have objective capabilities 
management processes. Furthermore, elements of RBT can be identified in all of these 
organizations’ structure and practices. 
To address the questions that motivated this study, we conclude that there is no single best 
practice regarding resource management. Nevertheless, our benchmarking effort offers examples 
of capabilities management approaches, either those prescribed by RBT or those employed by 
industry leaders, that can stimulate thinking amongst Sandia leadership in their efforts to develop 
approaches that best suit Sandia’s needs.  
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7. APPENDIX A: INDUSTRY INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 
Do you have a preferred terminology? 
Does your company subscribe to the concept of core capabilities / competencies ( i.e., a portfolio 
of competencies vs. portfolio of business areas?) 
• If not, how does your company view the role of groupings of skills and activities that 
provide value to customers in its strategic planning? 
How does your company identify core capabilities? Can you provide some examples? 
In your corporate model, who owns and maintains the core capabilities? 
How do you ensure that critical capabilities remain vibrant? 
How do you decide to invest in and grow new capabilities? Similarly, how do you decide to 
divest from capabilities? 
Do strategic partners fit into your capability construct? If so, how? 
What role do capabilities play in your targeting of market areas?  
• Do you start with a market segment and see how your capabilities might come into play 
therein – or do you start with capabilities and then identify market segments in which 
they will provide an advantage? 
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8. APPENDIX B: NOTES FROM INDUSTRY CONVERSATIONS 
8.1. Goodyear February 23, 2006. 
SNL participants: Mary Monson and Adam Slavin 
Interviewees subscribe to the view of core capabilities underlying organizational 
competitiveness. When interviewees set out to identify core capabilities, they first looked at the 
organizational chart, with the assumption that it represents a “binning” of important capabilities. 
They then ask whether the binning is still valid and viable. The have asked other parts of their 
organization for insights in this regard and found that it is difficult to get feedback. Some 
individuals feel threatened by an assessment of capabilities. Others lack the abilities to asses and 
/ or select important capabilities.   
Interviewees hold that capabilities must be assessed in the context of a corporate strategy. Thus, 
attributes needed for the envisioned future state can be identified and compared with existing 
attributes. They contend that, without a new concept for the future by which to evaluate 
capabilities, the future will, by default, look like the past. Interviewees caution that people will 
be threatened if they do not see themselves in the future vision. 
Goodyear is establishing a formal process for defining the future. Historically, Goodyear 
leadership defined the future in a piecemeal manner. Now, the desire is to look at the external 
environment and conduct road mapping in an effort to influence the future via a series of planned 
actions.  
Innovation is a core Goodyear capability. All seven points of CEO Keegan’s vision, “Seven 
Reasons to Believe,” include the word “innovation.” Historically, Goodyear has been able to 
(successfully) “innovate on demand” in response to crises. Interviewees noted that in stable 
times, innovation tends to give way to conservatism. In crises, innovation is more prevalent. This 
pendulum swing involves constant change (and therefore conflict). 
Interviewees’ current effort is an attempt to put Goodyear in the mode of continual innovation. 
To this end, interviewees have attempted to understand innovation. They have broken 
“innovation” into pieces and have found that a key feature to innovation is a combined 
awareness of both market needs and of availability of technologies and possible solutions. (for 
Goodyear, examples of market needs included smoother / quieter ride, improved snow traction, 
etc.). Developers understand the technology, but must be made aware of the market need so they 
can strive for innovative approaches for applying the technology. A key to this process is 
informal information exchange and dialog. Innovation is also cross-functional and requires 
people with diverse perspectives to be brought together.  
Interviewees are attempting to ensure that there are mechanisms to bring the pieces of innovation 
together. To this end, they have formed an “innovation hub.” Activities associated with the hub 
include electronic idea submission, exercises to make logical-minded technical people 
comfortable with often illogical elements of innovative thinking, and forums for information 
exchange during idea development.  
The organizational environment also must be conducive to innovation. Nevertheless, fostering a 
culture of innovation has been a tough sell at Goodyear. Interviewees contend that, although 
important in tight times, operational excellence tools such as Lean or Six Sigma tend to be 
structured, rigid, and linear. Thereby, these tools (and their associated mindset) militate against 
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innovation. To address this dichotomy, interviewees suggest encouraging different cultures in 
different parts of the organization, with the innovating parts being given more freedom. Notably, 
the culture becomes more constrained further down the product cycle. The Goodyear R&D 
budget is broken into two main pieces fundamental and applied. Fundamental covers anticipated 
needs whereas applied is directed at short-term goals. The innovation hub falls under the 
fundamental part. Interviewees noted that time will tell as to how the relatively new (~ few years 
old) innovation hub will be viewed by the larger organization.  
Interviewees gave examples of more tangible capabilities at Goodyear. These include computer 
modeling and simulation, and the Goodyear Vehicle Systems group (GVS) , which has pursed 
novel efforts such as a “smart tire” with embedded electronic sensors. Notably, Goodyear grew 
both of these capabilities from the ground up (Sandia National Laboratories has been a strategic 
partner in the modeling and simulation area). 
Divestment from a core capability historically has been painful and has been a response to 
significant threats to the company. When steel-belted tires were first introduced, the quality / 
quantity of steel wire that Goodyear needed were not available. To support wire production, 
Goodyear had to hire the gamut of personnel from R&D to manufacturing. Eventually, Goodyear 
divested from this capability. Interviewees observed that organizations often ignore irrelevant or 
weak areas. Yet, when crises occur, events tend unfold quickly and the weak areas are slashed. In 
the case of the wire capability, a “rare few” individuals were retrained. The vast majority were 
let go. Interviewees note that a long-range vision should identify irrelevant areas and allow time 
for graceful divestment. People can attempt to fit into the new vision and the organization can 
make plans to retain people. 
8.2. Intel, March 6, 2008 
SNL Participants: Adam Slavin and Bob Blewer. 
Recently, Intel underwent a “radical” transformation from being organized around technical 
areas (factory development, R&D, CPU designers) to being organized around platforms (e.g., 
mobile technologies, desktop technology, etc.).  The transformation was driven by a desire to be 
more customer focused and to allow groups to be able to produce a complete platform.  
Note that, because of its market value, the markup on an a complete iPod is greater than the 
markup on the individual components. 
Historically, silicon-related activities were top priority, with transistor development being next, 
followed by product development. The model was driven largely by an overarching strategy to 
“sell CPUs to Dell.” The customers were eager to by Intel’s products and the markup was high. 
Now, suppliers must “read the customer’s mind,” which is risky because the cost of 
miscalculation is high. Predicting customer needs is a key part of Intel’s marketing capability. 
Interviewee noted that Intel subscribes to the notion of competencies, but it took him a few 
moments to name the competencies. He noted the following competencies: silicon semi-
conductor production, launching new technologies, building and operating “fabs,” running 
supply lines, and market-need identification. 
When asked what subtle elements underlie these competencies, Interviewee noted systems 
orientation, structured risk taking, and failure analysis / problem solving (he also had to think 
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about these for a few moments). Interviewee claimed that these elements had ownership in 
corporate quality, and did not require much maintenance.  
The reward system includes a large spread in compensation (no raise at all is possible). 
Intel has done some strategic hiring to enhance capabilities in certain areas, but there are lots of 
in-house resources that can be tapped into. 
Regarding moving into completely new areas, “silicon” is the core business and Intel has not 
diversified beyond this. 
Intel has a unique culture that it instills in its employees via courses (e.g., how to run a meeting, 
how to have a technical argument). Management “open door.”  
Note the Intel development path goes from path finding (identifying new technology focus 
areas), road mapping (near term needs, dates, goals), basic R&D, and factory floor / process 
R&D. 
8.3. 3M, March 13, 2006 
SNL Participants: Mary Monson and Adam Slavin. 
3M is divided in to 5 large businesses (e.g. Industrial, Optical, Displays and Graphics, Health 
Care). Each large business is broken into divisions (e.g., Healthcare includes Dental, 
Pharmaceutical, Drug Dispensing, Orthodontics, etc.).  
3M uses the NTI and NPI processes which decouple technology development from product 
development. 
NTI is early stage development, with broad potential applicability. 
NPI is market-need driven applied development and typically occurs only after basic 
technological hurdles have been overcome (in NTI). 
3M has about 35 core technologies (e.g., micro-replication, adhesives, abrasives, advanced 
materials, nano-technology). A theme at 3M is multi-application elements. For example, many 
divisions (such as those in both the Industrial and the Health Care businesses) use adhesives. 
Interviewee noted that the subtle underlying elements include innovation, process development, 
manufacturing, marketing. 
R&D is done both at the corporate level and the business level. All divisions pay for corporate 
R&D as an overhead charge. The goal is to spin technologies off (via NTI) to useful NPI efforts. 
As such there is both a corporate adhesives capability and a division capability in places like 
Dental. The key is for the capabilities to communicate. 
Strategic planning is done both from a business and capability perspective. At the corporate 
level, they will look for “mega-trends” (e.g., nano-technology) and select associated markets. 
The technology to compete in these markets will be sought in-house, or acquired (e.g., 3M 
acquiring the leading preventative dental care company). There is also bottom-up strategic 
planning that occurs starts at the division level and works up. This planning tends to be more 
technology / capability focused. 
Regarding investment and divestment, by definition, core technologies are so spread out that 
divesting from them does not seem relevant or possible. 
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Note that in mature markets, there is fierce competition for miniscule advantages. Such 
conditions suggest moving into “adjacent” markets (i.e., those that are similar). For example the 
abrasives division expanded from sandpaper applications to developing specialty abrasives for 
polishing displays. 
They advised us to: 
• Look at how technologies cut across businesses. 
• Enhance communication of needs / technologies (this is ingrained at 3M). 
• Establish a dedicated marketing group. 
• Engage in meaningful strategic planning. 
8.4. Ford Motor Co., March 21, 2006 
SNL Participants: Mary Monson, Clint Atwood, Adam Slavin 
Interviewee is a 30-year employee who has worked primarily in the power-train (PT) group. He 
worked for nearly five years in the Product Development (PD) group. 
Interviewee noted that Ford subscribes to the concept of core capabilities. In the PT group, the 
core competencies are “the Five Cs”  (cylinder head, cylinder block, etc.). These are the core 
elements of engine engineering.  
Years ago, Ford did most things in house. Now they outsource things that can be readily 
manufactured by suppliers. Note that the focus at Ford is on manufacturing, even though they 
look for opportunities to outsource component manufacturing.  
Interviewee conceded that there is the potential to lose insights on products / processes when 
tasks are outsourced. To combat this, Ford retains the system integration role. They also have a 
rule that, if something is to be outsourced, there must be a person / people at Ford who know at 
least as much about the product as the group that will supply it. This prevents Ford from losing 
its understanding of the elements that comprise their products and assure quality. 
Interviewee noted that product engineering is collocated with manufacturing engineering. The 
physical collocation facilitates synergy / interaction. 
The Five Cs are a corporate asset situated within the PT group. When an engineer joins the PT 
group they begin a 2-year training process wherein, under the guidance of a mentor, they take 
classes on the fundamentals of power train engineering, do a series of rotations in different parts 
of the group, and receive on the job training. The culture and rewards in PT is very team oriented 
and production directed. Interviewee noted that when he did a stint with the PT group in Europe, 
he encountered virtually the same organizational culture he was familiar with here in the US. He 
felt more culture shock when he joined the PD group, which is here in the US, than he did when 
he went to the European PT group in Germany. The PD group is far less team oriented due to 
their focus on individual research and development accomplishments. There is much more 
individual competition and the rewards in place reinforce this individual contributor mentality. 
Interviewee shared that Ford is working to develop more of a “team” result orientation in the PD 
group without losing what is good about the R&D environment. He also stated that Ford’s goal is 
to have seamless transition from technology development to production.   
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Ford does not have many significant relationships with external non-supplier organizations in 
R&D (e.g., R&D groups). Note that only 10 percent of the Ford workforce is R&D related. The 
R&D groups are also not as team focused as PT, and tend to have an individual project focus 
rather than a product focus. Joint ventures focused on product and supplier relationships are 
abundant, however. 
Ford is working to bridge the cultural gap between R&D and PT, but the process is slow. They 
are using communication tools and slight modifications to rewards. 
Interviewee shared an example of divesting from a declining capability while simultaneously 
investing in a new capability. Around 15 years ago, electronics became a much more important 
element in automotive design. Ford was faced with either laying off large numbers of mechanical 
engineers (MEs) whose skill set was in much less demand in the company and replacing them 
with electrical engineers, or retraining the MEs to be more versatile. They chose to do the latter, 
partnering with Wayne State University in an onsite degree program that was very successful.  
Interviewee stressed that upfront, open, honest communication is key to successful transition, 
particularly when an organization is facing crises and cutbacks. Even if the news is uncertain or 
bad, Ford takes the approach that it is always better to communicate (than to not). 
8.5. NASA, March 23, 2006 
SNL Participants: Mary Monson and  Adam Slavin 
NASA firmly believes in the concept of core capabilities. Each Center (e.g., Johnson Space 
Center, Kennedy Space Center, etc. – NASA has ~10 Centers) has a small list of capabilities (~3-
4). Each Center’s capabilities must have a proven track record. NASA is “brutal” in assessing 
whether an area is actually a capability. Most capabilities are expressed a brief description (“one 
liner”).  A notional example is: “Rapid development, prototyping, and demonstration of payload 
delivery vehicles.” Notably, the interviewee was not at liberty to disclose NASA’s list of 
capabilities, as the categorization is viewed as proprietary. 
Capabilities are largely retained through a competitive model. Capabilities that starve (i.e., do 
not bring in sufficient external project funding) are abandoned.   
NASA’s horizontal structure makes it very adept at partnering both across NASA Centers and 
with others (e.g., SNL, USAF). The downside is that it can take NASA a long time to initiate 
programs.  
Part of NASA’s approach of maintaining capabilities is to maintain focus, and not diffuse 
resources. NASA’s strategy for success is to horizontally integrate the capabilities from all 
across NASA to accomplish tasks. NASA has become a “super matrix” organization. NASA will 
direct efforts to the Center that owns a capability. It will not shift or replicate capabilities (a few 
are shared between sites, with each site having a unique focus). In addition, NASA does not 
accept work that does not fit under their capabilities. The interviewee provided the example of 
another government agency offering significant funding to do a job for which NASA had the 
necessary expertise. Yet, the work did not fall under any of NASA’s capabilities, and was not 
accepted. 
It could be said that one of NASA’s capabilities is program management (which they refer to as 
program “leadership”). NASA is very agile in managing programs and can internally shut down 
or redirect major a programs (on the order of hundreds of millions of dollars)  in 120 days. 
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NASA has a distinct career path for project managers. These managers do not supervise 
personnel. Instead they focus on project execution. Project managers do a large part of the 
horizontal integration work. The NASA project culture encourages doing what is best for the 
government rather than what is best for NASA. The interviewee shared an anecdote about a 
project leader seeking flight test support from an external provider because their cost would be 
significantly less than NASA’s. The project leader was able to do this without suffering 
recrimination at NASA.  
The interviewee had some advice for Sandia regarding strategic partnerships. The interviewee 
commented that SNL is probably the fastest organization he has seen when it comes to 
development, prototype, and demonstration (note that the interviewee has interacted with SNL 
only as a WFO partner). He attributes the speed to the fact that all of these activities can be 
accomplished in a single Vice Presidency (Division). He notes that things become much more 
cumbersome once SNL programs cross internal organizational lines – becoming even worse as 
we attempt to partner with external organizations. He noted that SNL does not have a culture of 
partnering. We are not rewarded for horizontal thinking, and we often feel threatened by 
partners. He stressed that partnering is a two-way street and that we (SNL) should avoid the 
“vendor” mentality when attempting to establish strategic partnerships. 
Projects (i.e., external funding) fund most R&D at NASA. In some instances, NASA will 
provide core funding for some R&D to get initiatives to the TRL-I to TRL-III levels. Then, 
projects must provide the rest of the funding. The interviewee contends that NASA’s strengths in 
integration and program management tend to come into play once the initiative has reaches a 
higher TRL and moves into the multi-million dollar scale. 
Note that NASA’s mission is to advance public application of space and aeronautics. As such, all 
projects must ultimately tie back to this. Accordingly, it does not have much role in defense or 
intelligence space applications. 
8.6. Boeing Plant Visit, June 21, 2006 
SNL Attendee: Adam Slavin 
Boeing listed its core competencies as customer knowledge and focus, Lean enterprise, and LSI 
(large system integration). Boeing develops cultures and values via new hire orientation (lasting 
2 to 3 days to a few weeks), new hire rotations, organizational indoctrination sessions, discipline-
specific training (e.g., structural analysis).  
The 737 is built in Renton. Boeing purchases the 737 fuselage section but does produce the wing 
section. Much of the Boeing value added is in ensuring that all of the externally supplied sub-
systems (avionics, seats, etc.) come together as a system that meets all requirements. Boeing 
does design many of these components – they design the fuselage. There are more than 300 
vendors in England alone that supply parts for the 737. 
Boeing sold the Wichita facility that builds fuselages to Spirit AeroSystems, a newly formed 
subsidiary of Onex, and now purchases fuselages from Spirit. Boeing elected to divest from this 
area in order to focus on their strength in LSI. Note that a Chinese company will build the 787 
wings. 
Boeing makes the wings and aft fuselage for the F22. F22 CDR was in 1995, low rate production 
started in 1998. The current production rate is ~24 per year. 
 35
Boeing was given ~ $17m over three years to implement Lean techniques on the F22 Wing / 
fuselage, making the case to the DoD that so doing would save ~ $100m. The DoD customer 
gave Boeing the $17m, notifying them that they would deduct the $100m from Boeing’s fee, 
regardless of how much Boeing was able to save. 
General Observations  
• The competitive environment has forced Boeing to acknowledge failures. Leadership tends 
to take the lead in setting an example. 
• They contend that there must be constant pressure from management to drive change. 
• Quote - “leadership tends to get along well.” 
• Observation - Boeing management appear to take communication seriously. 
• They recognize the need to link personal growth (of the employee) to change efforts and 
improvements. Therefore, transformation involves investment in people.  
• Lean efforts had grassroots support, but they couldn’t move ahead without upper 
management support (there was often the “frozen middle” that was oppositional). 
• Change managers tend to get impatient and / or lose their drive when the going gets tough 
– often moving on to a new plan. This creates the “flavor of the month” perception. 
• Boeing put the manufacturing engineers in the production plant. 
• Boeing is a big mod-sim (modeling and simulation) user, applying a gate process wherein 
some gates require some mod-sim.  
• Observation: the Boeing personnel talked a lot about their customers. 
• Boeing refers to production personnel as “mechanics.” 
• A key to implementing Lean was a promise to workers that no one would be let go as a 
result (they might be reassigned within Boeing). 
• Best work cell on the floor has no supervisor.  
• “Moonshine room” stocked with parts to allow mechanics to make their own tooling to 
support manufacturing processes.  
• Production line obtained a ~$300k quote from the in-house tooling group. Production then 
procured a tool to meet their needs from an outside producer for ~$10k. 
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